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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the understandings animating feminist abortion rights 
claims in the years before Roe v. Wade1 – claims that helped prompt Roe, but 
were not expressed in the decision.  By reconstructing these sex equality 
claims, we can better appreciate how feminist advocacy engendered Roe, and 
the conflict that ensued.2  Recovering this lost history in turn helps us 
 
* Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale University.  This Article is dedicated 
to Catherine Roraback, in honor of her work litigating Griswold v. Connecticut, Abele v. 
Markle, and so many other path-breaking civil rights cases, and to Nancy Stearns, whose 
movement cases helped engender Roe.  I am especially indebted to historian Amy 
Kesselman for sharing sources she has collected on the Abele case; to Camilla Tubbs and 
others in the Yale Law Library for incomparable support; and to my research assistant 
Jennifer Keighley who has pursued the task of recovering sources with imagination, 
precision, and commitment.  The Article benefited from comments at a workshop at Boston 
University School of Law, during a visit to deliver the Distinguished Lecture in February of 
2009.  Ali Frick and Tara Rice provided invaluable assistance in the Article’s publication. 
Since writing this Article, Linda Greenhouse and I have collaborated on a documentary 
history that explores some of the questions the Article examines, and many others.  See 
LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE 
ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING; A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
(2010).  The book makes available a number of documents here discussed, as I note 
throughout. 
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
2 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 406-24 (2007).  
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recognize that ongoing evolution in the constitutional basis of the abortion 
right continues even in our own day.   
In the immediate aftermath of Gonzales v. Carhart,3 the Supreme Court’s 
2007 decision upholding the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, attention focused 
on striking features of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion – its deference to 
congressional fact-finding, its narrowing of the health exception, its use of 
antiabortion rhetoric, and its discussion of gender-paternalist reasons for 
restricting abortion.4  Few commentators focused on noteworthy developments 
in the reasoning of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.5  Cass Sunstein was one.  In an 
op-ed in the Los Angeles Times the day after the decision, he observed:  
In the long run, the most important part of the Supreme Court’s ruling on 
“partial-birth” abortions may not be Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s 
opinion for the majority.  It might well be Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
dissent, which attempts, for the first time in the [C]ourt’s history, to 
justify the right to abortion squarely in terms of women’s equality rather 
than privacy.6 
In a strategy memo to the antiabortion movement posted several months 
later on the internet, James Bopp, general counsel for the National Right to 
Life Committee, drew strikingly similar conclusions.  Bopp cautioned the 
antiabortion movement against enacting abortion bans to test Roe because, 
Bopp worried, if the Supreme Court faced such a case, Justice Ginsburg would 
have the opportunity to entrench the equality rationale for abortion restrictions 
in a plurality opinion that might even attract Kennedy’s support:  
 But if the U.S. Supreme Court, as presently constituted, were to 
actually accept a case challenging the declared constitutional right to 
abortion, there is the potential danger that the Court might actually make 
things worse than they presently are.  The majority might abandon its 
current “substantive due process” analysis (i.e., reading “fundamental” 
rights into the “liberty” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against 
infringement without due process) in favor of what Justice Ginsberg [sic] 
 
3 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
4 See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1697, 1767, 1769 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity]; 
see also Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 1014-30 
(2008); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of 
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1641 (2008) [hereinafter 
Siegel, Right’s Reasons]; Martha K. Plante, Current Events, “Protecting” Women’s Health: 
How Gonzales v. Carhart Endangers Women’s Health and Women’s Equal Right to 
Personhood Under the Constitution, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 400-07 
(2008).   
5 But see Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical 
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 837-38 (2007).  
6 Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., Ginsburg’s Dissent May Yet Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
2007, at A31.  
 2010] ROE’S ROOTS 1877 
 
has long advocated – an “equal protection” analysis under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), the dissent, 
written by Justice Ginsberg [sic], in fact did so.  See id. at 1641 
(Ginsberg, [sic] J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (“[L]egal 
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to 
vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a 
woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal 
citizenship stature.”). . . .  A law prohibiting abortion would force Justice 
Kennedy to vote to strike down the law, giving Justice Ginsberg [sic] the 
opportunity to rewrite the justification for the right to abortion for the 
Court.  This is highly unlikely in a case that decides the constitutionality 
of such things as PBA bans, parental involvement laws, women’s right-
to-know laws, waiting periods, and other legislative acts that do not 
prohibit abortion in any way, since Justice Kennedy is likely to approve 
such laws.7   
In the past several decades, the nation has watched as the Court has 
narrowed the reach of the right Roe v. Wade protects.  But, as Bopp 
emphasizes, the Court, in a less noticed set of developments, has also begun 
subtly to rearticulate the rationale of the abortion right – the complex of 
constitutional values that the right to choose vindicates.  
It has long been appreciated that Justice Ginsburg might lead the Court to 
emphasize the equal protection argument for abortion rights.  In 1985 and 
again in 1992, Ginsburg published articles arguing that Roe should have been 
decided on sex equality grounds.8  At her confirmation hearing in 1993, 
Ginsburg was discussing a 1972 case in which she had argued that the Air 
Force’s decision to fire an officer because she was pregnant violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.9  Asked by Senator Hank Brown whether the same 
reasoning extended to abortion as well, then Judge Ginsburg answered: 
 
7 See Legal Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Attorneys at 
Law, to Whom it May Concern on Pro-life Strategy Issues 3-4 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at 
http://personhood.net/docs/BoppMemorandum1.pdf.  
8 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. 
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (arguing that a more narrowly tailored holding in Roe v. 
Wade that rested on gender equality grounds and did not go beyond the particularly extreme 
statute at stake would have accomplished the goal of facilitating the political development 
of abortion rights without prompting as much social opposition and backlash); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1200 (1992) (“The Roe 
decision might have been less of a storm center had it . . . ho[n]ed in more precisely on the 
women’s equality dimension of the issue . . . .”).   
9 See Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-
178).  For an account of the Struck case in Justice Ginsburg’s understanding of equality, see 
Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010).  See also Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, A Postscript to Struck by Stereotype, 59 DUKE L.J. 799 (2010).  For an account 
locating the claims of pregnancy discrimination in the sex equality arguments of the 1970s 
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[Y]ou asked me about my thinking about equal protection versus 
individual autonomy, and my answer to you is it’s both.  This is 
something central to a woman’s life, to her dignity.  It’s a decision she 
must make for herself.  And when Government controls that decision for 
her, she’s being treated as less than a fully adult human responsible for 
her own choices.10 
In asserting the sex equality argument for abortion rights, Ginsburg 
expresses an understanding widely shared in the women’s movement in the 
years before Roe.  There are, in fact, many expressions of what I term the sex 
equality argument for reproductive rights: objections to laws restricting 
abortion that reflect or enforce traditional gender roles in matters of sex or 
parenting.  The sex equality claim for reproductive rights may, but need not, be 
asserted as a claim on the Equal Protection Clause;11 these same concerns may 
be articulated in the language of dignity or in the language of liberty, as 
women claim the right to be self-governing and shape their own life course as 
full members of the polity.  Reconstructing Roe’s roots shows that sex equality 
concepts shaped the initial development of modern substantive due process 
 
women’s movement, see generally Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in 
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010); Neil S. Siegel & 
Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1095 (2010); Reva B. Siegel, Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (writing Roe drawing on legal and social movement sources 
available at the time Roe was decided, with historical note on text).  See also Jack M. 
Balkin, Introduction: Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE 
SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, at 3, 19-20. 
10 The Supreme Court; Excerpts from Senate Hearing on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 1993, at A20 (“The argument was it’s her right to decide either way, her 
right to decide whether or not to bear a child.”).  As Ginsburg explained, the decision about 
whether and when to become a mother was so central to a woman’s life that retaining 
control over it implicated her dignity as a human being, exactly the ground Justice Kennedy 
emphasized in a key passage of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) he subsequently quotes in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003): 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in 
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State. 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851, quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
11 See Siegel, supra note 5, at 821, 823 (“The sex equality approach to reproductive 
rights opposes laws restricting abortion or contraception to the extent that such laws 
presuppose or entrench customary, gender-differentiated norms concerning sexual 
expression and parenting. . . .  But these views have not always – or even most commonly – 
been expressed as claims about the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
or the case law associated with it.”).  
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doctrines and are still continuing to shape its development today.  It is now 
common to find abortion rights asserted as compound claims on dignity, 
liberty, and equality, as they initially were.12  
In the remainder of this Article, I will be reconstructing the equality 
argument for the abortion right as it was originally asserted by the women’s 
movement in the years before Roe.  To do so, I tell the story of Abele v. 
Markle13 – otherwise known as Women vs. Connecticut – a suit the women’s 
movement brought challenging Connecticut’s abortion ban decided in the 
Second Circuit the year before Roe.  I then compare Abele and Roe.  As we 
will see, Abele significantly influenced Roe and is in fact cited in it, but Roe’s 
reasoning substantially obscures the sex equality claim that in part prompted 
the decision.   
I. FROM DOCTORS RIGHTS TO WOMEN’S RIGHTS  
As stories of Roe have typically emphasized, criminal prosecution of doctors 
who performed abortions and their patients was common in the 1960s, but 
these prosecutions met with increasing public disapproval – especially in the 
case of Sherri Finkbine, a woman who sought to end her pregnancy after 
discovering that she had ingested thalidomide, known to cause severe 
developmental malformations.14  In 1962 the American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
proposed liberalizing abortion law through model legislation allowing so-
called therapeutic abortions15 which gave doctors substantial discretion in 
determining when abortion was lawful.  The ALI reforms proposed a 
framework in which a committee of two doctors could authorize abortions for 
three types of causes: rape or incest, the mother’s physical or mental health, or 
fetal anomalies.16  The medical model of abortion reform was gender-
 
12 Compare Betty Friedan’s initial articulation of feminist demands for repeal of laws 
criminalizing abortion, see infra text accompanying notes 21-25, with Justice Ginsburg’s 
testimony in her confirmation hearing, see supra text accompanying note 10.  On dignity 
arguments for the abortion right, see Siegel, Dignity, supra note 4, at 1735-66.  On the 
interplay of liberty and equality arguments for the abortion right, see Siegel, supra note 5, at 
831. 
13 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972). 
14 DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 285-89 (1998); see also Sherri Chessen 
Finkbine, The Lesser of Two Evils, Speech Before the Society for Humane Abortion (Jan. 9, 
1966), in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, at 11-18 (reprinting the transcript from a 
1966 conference on “abortion and human dignity” where Finkbine gave a first-person 
account of her experience).  
15 GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO 163-64 (2005).  
16 The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code reforms stated: 
A licensed physician is justified in terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is 
substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or 
mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with grave physical or 
mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious 
intercourse. 
 1880 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1875 
 
paternalist.  It protected women and their families against the hazards of illegal 
abortion in exceptional circumstances where pregnancy was understood to be 
onerous because coerced or otherwise posing a threat to the health of women 
or their children – a determination that doctors would be authorized to make 
with increasing autonomy from government.  Historian Gene Burns describes 
1966-1970 as a period in which “an elite movement of physicians, clergy, and 
legislators succeeded in convincing numerous state legislatures to liberalize 
their abortion laws.”17  But reform, he emphasizes, bogged down as it got 
caught up in other forces.  During the 1960s, support for abortion reform began 
to flow from new sources – from a movement for population control, from a 
burgeoning “sexual revolution,” and from a movement for women’s rights that 
exploded in the late 1960s.  As Burns and Linda Gordon emphasize, feminist 
claims fundamentally altered the dynamic of the physician-led reform 
movement.18  
The women’s movement challenged the medical model of liberalization.  
The movement sought political authority for women, both in shaping abortion 
law and in making the abortion decision itself.  In February of 1969, 
Redstockings, a women’s liberation group, protested the New York 
legislature’s hearings on abortion reform, objecting to the absence of women in 
the hearing, and, a few weeks later holding a public speak-out at the 
Washington Square Methodist Church entitled Abortion: Tell It Like It Is.  The 
event provided women a public platform in which to describe their experiences 
with the abortion laws, on the model of feminist “consciousness-raising.”19  
Susan Brownmiller has described the March 1969 speak-out as “an emblematic 
event for Women’s Liberation. . . .  The importance of personal testimony in a 
public setting, which overthrew the received wisdom of ‘the experts,’ cannot 
be overestimated.”20  Abortion rights supporters understood that most women 
sought abortions for reasons other than the therapeutic model indicated and 
believed that women should be allowed to make that decision for themselves 
without having to plead with a doctor for permission. 
 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
17 BURNS, supra note 15, at 168.  
18 Id. at 211, 221.  Historian Linda Gordon has argued that one of the major reasons that 
reproductive rights became such a politically charged issue in the early 1970s was that the 
right to reproductive control “seemed to express the core aims of the women’s liberation 
movement and thus became the major focus of the backlash against feminism.”  LINDA 
GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN 
AMERICA 295 (2002).  On the sexual revolution of the 1960s, see DAVID ALLYN, MAKE 
LOVE, NOT WAR: THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION: AN UNFETTERED HISTORY (2000); JANE 
GERHARD, DESIRING REVOLUTION: SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM AND THE REWRITING OF 
AMERICAN SEXUAL THOUGHT, 1920 TO 1982 (2001). 
19 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, IN OUR TIME: MEMOIR OF A REVOLUTION 108 (1999).  
20 Id. at 109; see also Susan Brownmiller, “Everywoman’s Abortions: The Oppressor Is 
Man,” VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 27, 1969, at 1, reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 
*, at 127-30.   
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“There is only one voice that needs to be heard on the question of the final 
decision as to whether a woman will or will not bear a child, and that is the 
voice of the woman herself.”21  Betty Friedan’s 1969 speech Abortion: A 
Woman’s Civil Right, which she delivered at a conference founding the 
National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (“NARAL”), offered a 
new feminist perspective on traditional morals regulation.  Abortion laws 
symbolically expressed and practically enforced women’s secondary social 
status.  Friedan rejected incremental reform of laws criminalizing abortion and 
sought instead their repeal, a claim that Friedan asserted on the grounds of 
liberty, equality, and dignity. 
[T]here is no freedom, no equality, no full human dignity and personhood 
possible for women until we assert and demand the control over our own 
bodies, over our own reproductive process.   
. . . . 
 Then and only then will women move out of their enforced passivity, . 
. . their definition as sex objects as things to human personhood, to self-
determination, to human dignity . . . .22  
Abortion was no longer simply a question of public health.  On Friedan’s 
reframing, abortion laws expressed women’s social standing, their authority to 
govern their own lives:  
Women are denigrated in this country, because women are not deciding 
the conditions of their own society and their own lives.  Women are not 
taken seriously as people.  Women are not seen seriously as people.  So 
this is the new name of the game on the question of abortion: that 
women’s voices are heard.23 
Repealing laws criminalizing abortion would confer on women, at one and the 
same time, liberty and equality – control over the direction of their own lives 
to which men were generally presumed entitled:  
[T]here are certain rights that have never been defined as rights, that are 
essential to equality for women, and they were not defined in the 
Constitution of this, or any country, when that Constitution was written 
only by men.  The right of woman to control her reproductive process 
must be established as a basic and valuable human civil right not to be 
denied or abridged by the state.24 
 
21 Betty Friedan, President, NOW, Abortion: A Woman’s Civil Right, Speech Given at 
the First National Conference on Abortion Laws (Feb. 1969), in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, 
supra note *, at 39 (reprinting Friedan’s 1969 speech at the conference giving rise to 
National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (“NARAL”)).  
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
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Decriminalizing abortion would not only change women’s experience of sex 
and parenting, Friedan argued; it would recognize women’s competence and 
moral authority as decision-makers, and so transform their social standing.  
Friedan invokes this fusion of roles and standing, of liberty and equality, as 
dignity:  
 Am I saying that women must be liberated from motherhood?  No, I 
am not.  I am saying that motherhood will only be liberated to be a joyous 
and responsible human act when women are free to make with full 
conscious choice and full human responsibility the decision to be 
mothers. . . . 
. . . . 
 So this is the real sexual revolution.  Not what they so cheaply make 
headlines in the papers, at what age boys and girls go to bed with each 
other and whether they do it with or without the benefit of marriage.  
That’s the least of it.  The real sexual revolution is the emergence of 
women from passivity, from thing-ness . . . to full self-determination, to 
full dignity. . . .25 
Where the ALI model rationalized liberalization as needed to protect 
women’s health, the women’s movement sought repeal of abortion laws to 
promote women’s equal standing as citizens.  The women’s rights challenge to 
abortion laws was part of a larger challenge to gender roles that shaped 
women’s public and private lives.  As Linda Gordon observes, movement 
support for the abortion right in the early 1970s  
rested on a more grassroots and comprehensive feminist program than 
had the previous wave.  It invented a new word – ‘sexism’ – which 
condemned practices once not even reprehensible, and invented an 
analysis that challenged not only sexual inequality but gender itself, 
including the view that motherhood had to be women’s primary 
identity.26  
The women’s movement of this era identified transformation in gender roles 
concerning sex and parenting as central to women’s freedom and equality, and 
expressed this vision in constitutional terms.  At its second national conference 
in 1967, the National Organization of Women (“NOW”) identified passage of 
the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”), repeal of all abortion laws, and public 
funding of childcare among its goals in a “Bill of Rights for Women.”27  In 
1970, the movement commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the woman 
suffrage amendment with an inaugural strike for equality.  It staged protest 
actions in forty cities around the nation that tied abortion to questions of 
political participation, work and education, and the social organization of 
 
25 Id. at 40. 
26 GORDON, supra note 18, at 297. 
27 National Organization for Women Bill of Rights in 1968, reprinted in FEMINIST 
CHRONICLES 1953-1993, at 214 (Toni Carabillo et al. eds., 1993).  
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childrearing.  The strike sought ratification of the ERA and three demands: 
equality of opportunity in education and employment, access to abortion, and 
access to publicly supported childcare.28  
As the strike demands illustrate, abortion rights meant something very 
different on the medical and women’s rights models.  In challenging criminal 
abortion statutes, the women’s rights movement was challenging institutional 
norms and structures that define women as mothers and define motherhood as 
inconsistent with core activities of citizenship, making the work of motherhood 
a source of exclusion and dependence for women.  With this critical 
understanding of motherhood, feminists understood the criminalization of 
abortion to inflict harms, in addition to the threats it might pose for women’s 
health. 
As Friedan and others argued, laws requiring women to become mothers 
against their will inflicted dignitary harm, because such laws defined women’s 
sexual and social lives solely in terms of their role as child bearers.  Once 
feminists questioned this root assumption, the use of the criminal law to 
enforce role compliance looked deeply suspect.  The harm was not only 
dignitary.  Criminal abortion statutes allowed the society to decide the life 
plans of any sexually active woman, treating consent to sex – or lack thereof – 
as consent to motherhood.29  Laws that deprived women of control over the 
timing of motherhood in turn exacerbated the relations of economic exclusion 
and interpersonal dependence that the social organization of motherhood 
imposed on women.  Framed as part of a challenge to the social organization of 
 
28 Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1373-75 (2006); Shirley 
Bernard, The Women’s Strike: August 26, 1970 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Antioch College) (on file with author); see also Betty Friedan, President, NOW, Call to 
Women’s Strike for Equality, Speech Given at the 1970 NOW Convention in Chicago (Mar. 
20, 1970), in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, at 41-43 (reprinting the text of Friedan’s 
speech calling for the Women’s Strike for Equality, “a 24-hour general strike . . . of all 
women in America against the concrete conditions of their oppression”); GREENHOUSE & 
SIEGEL, supra note *, at 44 (demonstrating the strike’s three key demands through the 
reprinting of a 1970 flyer summoning women to a post-strike mass meeting to further press 
these demands).  
29 As historian Leslie Reagan has observed:  
[N]o contraceptive, not even “the pill” introduced in 1960, was 100 percent effective.  
Furthermore, birth control was hard to get, especially for the unmarried, and some men 
refused to use it.  When women faced unwanted pregnancies, hundreds of thousands of 
them, married and unmarried, both in the movement and in the mainstream, searched 
for abortions.  Women who never had an abortion needed it as a backup.  Abortion was 
actually used, potentially needed, and representative of women’s sexual and 
reproductive freedom.  Each of these meanings underpinned feminist support for legal 
and accessible abortion. 
LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW 1867-
1973, at 229 (1997). 
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sex and motherhood, the abortion rights claim was an incendiary cocktail of 
gender justice claims. 
How did the movement seek constitutional vindication of women’s right to 
be free of coerced motherhood?  By 1970, there was already constitutional 
litigation afoot, but these first challenges to the constitutionality of abortion 
restrictions were an outgrowth of the medical model of liberalization.30  The 
lawsuits challenged abortion laws as infringing the constitutional rights of 
doctors – often contesting prosecutions on grounds of vagueness.  In the 1969 
case of People v. Belous,31 a physician made history by persuading the 
California Supreme Court to strike down the state’s criminal abortion statute in 
an opinion that protected the doctor as vindicating constitutionally protected 
interests of his patients.  In United States v. Vuitch,32 a plaintiff physician and 
nurse’s aide challenged the District of Columbia’s abortion statute, which the 
district court found void for vagueness;33 the Supreme Court reversed in April 
of 1971, construing the health exception in the federal statute expansively to 
protect physician autonomy, but refusing to reach the patient rights claims to 
which the district court had adverted.34  
The first abortion rights cases advanced vagueness claims focused on the 
constitutional rights of doctors, even as it remained unclear whether the 
medical profession had any special immunity from public regulation, except 
insofar as doctors were indirectly raising what might be understood as 
constitutional claims of their patients, as the courts in Belous and Vuitch 
suggested.35  But as of 1970, what rights did their patients have?  In 1970, the 
Court had never found a single law to violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because it discriminated on the grounds of sex.  The claims of their patients in 
this period were limited to the rights Griswold v. Connecticut36 protected – a 
right of privacy extending at least to the use of contraception in marriage.  
 
30 For an in-depth account of these early cases with a particular focus on the New York 
litigation, see Linda J. Greenhouse, Constitutional Question: Is There a Right to Abortion?, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 25, 1970, at 200, reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, 
at 130-39.  
31 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).  This case successfully challenged California’s abortion 
statute on behalf of a plaintiff physician.  
32 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
33 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-35 (D.D.C. 1969).  
34 402 U.S. at 71-72.  This is not to say that women’s rights claims were not made in 
Vuitch.  A feminist brief was filed on behalf of Human Rights for Women that alleged that 
the statute violated women’s right to privacy and liberty, Equal Protection, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  Brief for Human Rights for Women, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 8-
13, Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (No. 84).   
35 On vagueness doctrine of the era, see Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme 
Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the 
History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2010). 
36 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
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The women’s movement set out to make women’s claims about abortion 
audible, as the NOW Bill of Rights emphasized, first through repeal of 
criminal abortion statutes – and then through litigation.  A pioneer state, New 
York, illustrated both.  The lawsuit challenging New York’s abortion law was 
initially filed on behalf of plaintiff physicians, but it was soon joined with 
companion suits on behalf of clergy referral activists and legal services 
organizations who represented poor women,37 – and Abramowicz v. 
Lefkowitz,38 a suit brought by a large group of female plaintiffs.39   
Nancy Stearns of the Center for Constitutional Rights (“CCR”) brought the 
women’s suit against New York’s law; her aim was to represent women 
directly, instead of through doctors, employing the affirmative litigation 
strategy of CCR founder Arthur Kinoy.40  Rather than litigate civil rights cases 
defensively, Kinoy “went on the offensive by initiating federal lawsuits with 
massive numbers of plaintiffs.”41  
Unlike earlier lawsuits that had framed the issue on the medical model, as 
the right of counselors and doctors to perform abortions, the Abramowicz 
complaint framed the issue as a woman’s right to an abortion.42  The suit was 
filed as a class action and the named plaintiffs consisted of 109 women; some 
were married, some had abortions in the past, and some had to bear unwanted 
children.43  Not only was the identity of the plaintiffs different; the suit 
employed new feminist modes of argument as well.  The brief in Abramowicz 
opened by recounting stories contained in the depositions of fourteen witnesses 
who had testified “concerning the harshness of the abortion laws upon women 
and the interferences of the laws with women’s constitutionally protected 
rights.”44  The brief asserted that the abortion laws “are both a result and 
symbol of the unequal treatment of women that exists in this society.”45  It 
reasoned that so long as “such a broad range of disabilities are permitted to 
attach to the status of pregnancy and motherhood, that status must be one of 
choice.”46 
 
37 GARROW, supra note 14, at 380.  
38 Hall v. Lefkowitz (Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz), 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
39 For more on Abramowicz and many of the litigation papers from the suit, including the 
plaintiffs’ depositions, see generally DIANE SCHULDER & FLORYNCE KENNEDY, ABORTION 
RAP (1971).  
40 BROWNMILLER, supra note 19, at 111.  
41 Id. at 110.  
42 Janice Goodman, Rhonda Copelon Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe: 
Where Do We Go from Here?, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP., Spring 1973, at 20, 22. 
43 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hall, 305 F. Supp. 1030, reprinted in 
SCHULDER & KENNEDY, supra note 39, at 190. 
44 Plaintiffs’ Brief at 1, Hall, 305 F. Supp. 1030 (No. 69 Civ. 4469).  Excerpts from this 
brief are republished in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, at 140-47.  
45 Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 44, at 87.  
46 Id. at 40. 
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Activism surrounding the suit was so successful it prompted the legislature 
to take action.  In the wake of a mass demonstration,47 the legislature voted to 
legalize abortion until the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy,48 – effectively 
satisfying the movement’s repeal aims – and the Abramowicz suit was 
dismissed as moot.49  Although a final decision was never issued in the case,50 
Stearns’ New York suit prompted other movement litigation.   
II. WOMEN VS. CONNECTICUT  
With the Abramowicz suit moot, Connecticut became an arena developing 
women’s claim to abortion rights in the case of Abele v. Markle, commonly 
known as Women vs. Connecticut.  The organizers of the Connecticut suit, 
which included several Yale Law School students, recruited Katie Roraback, 
Planned Parenthood’s counsel in Connecticut who had worked with Professor 
Thomas Emerson on litigating Griswold, to serve as lead counsel in the 
challenge to Connecticut’s nineteenth-century abortion law.51  Roraback 
 
47 SCHULDER & KENNEDY, supra note 39, at 178.  This mass demonstration occurred just 
one year after the Redstockings speak-out at the Washington Square Methodist Church.  Id.; 
BROWNMILLER, supra note 19, at 108. 
48 SCHULDER & KENNEDY, supra note 39, at 178-79.  
49 The opinion dismissing Abramowicz and its companion suits as moot was issued on 
July 1, 1970, but it was not published in any official court reporter.  Hall, 305 F. Supp. 1030 
(No. 69 Civ. 4469); see also SCHULDER & KENNEDY, supra note 39, at 178.  
Legalization of abortion in New York energized opponents of abortion who mobilized 
with such energy “that they almost succeeded in legislatively repealing the New York 
legalization statute; only a 1972 gubernatorial veto by Nelson Rockefeller prevented such an 
anti-abortion triumph and kept legal abortion available in New York in the months 
immediately preceding the decision in Roe.”  David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After 
Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 841 (1999).  Response to the 
New York statute has been largely ignored by scholars who argue that Roe unnecessarily 
provoked a disastrous backlash in a climate of state-by-state legalization of the abortion 
right.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991) 
(“By 1973 . . . state legislatures were moving firmly to expand legal access to abortion, and 
it is likely that a broad guarantee of access would have been available even without Roe.”  
(footnote omitted)); Michael Kinsley, The Right’s Kind of Activism, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 
2004, at B7 (“Roe is what first politicized religious conservatives while cutting off a 
political process that was legalizing abortion state by state anyway.”).  
50 The draft opinion composed by Judge Friendly, however, suggests that if the court had 
issued its opinion, the plaintiffs would not have succeeded at overturning the law.  Judge 
Friendly’s draft opinion is reproduced in A. Raymond Randolph, Circuit Judge, United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft 
Abortion Opinion, Barbara K. Olson Memorial Lecture at the Federalist Society’s National 
Lawyers Convention (Nov. 11, 2005), in 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035, 1058 (2006). 
51 Amy Kesselman, Women Versus Connecticut: Conducting a Statewide Hearing on 
Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 42, 47 (Rickie Solinger ed., 
1998).  Other Connecticut lawyers involved in Abele included Kathryn Emmett, Marjory 
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worked with Nancy Stearns of the CCR, the lawyer for Abramowicz who had 
also helped file suits with large named plaintiff classes in New Jersey52 and 
Rhode Island,53 and who assisted similar cases in Massachusetts54 and 
Pennsylvania.55  These suits helped establish the understanding that criminal 
abortion laws inflicted constitutionally significant harm on women, as well as 
doctors.  
Like Abramowicz, Women vs. Connecticut was conceived of as an 
opportunity to mobilize and educate.56  The group organizing Women vs. 
Connecticut wrote a pamphlet for recruiting women to volunteer as plaintiffs in 
a suit challenging Connecticut’s abortion law.  In what follows, I reconstruct 
the plaintiffs’ claims from the organizing pamphlet, a state hearing, and several 
published decisions.  The recruitment pamphlet, in particular, documents the 
master narratives that organizers used the suit to disseminate.57  
Connecticut’s abortion law, which had been on the books since the 
nineteenth century, was quite stringent.  It allowed abortions only to preserve 
the life of the mother; women who had abortions, anyone who performed an 
abortion, or anyone who assisted in arranging the abortion could be imprisoned 
or fined.58  But the recruitment pamphlet located its challenge to the state’s 
abortion law in a more wide-ranging critique of the social relations in which 
women conceived and bore children.  The claim to constitutional protection of 
women’s decisions challenged the social understandings and arrangements that 
pressured women to bear children and that pressured women to end 
pregnancies:  
 For years women have been under constant pressure to have children.  
Our culture teaches us that we are not complete women unless we have 
children.  
. . . .  
 Other pressures compel some of us not to have children.  If we are 
unmarried, we become social outcasts by bearing children.  Those of us 
who are poor and live on welfare know that opponents of welfare want to 
 
Gelb, Barbara Milstein, and Marilyn Seichter.  Id. at 52.  Yale Law School students 
involved in organizing the case included Gail Falk, Ann C. Hill, and Ann Freedman.  
52 YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (D.N.J. 1972).  
53 Women of R.I. v. Israel, No. 4605 (D.R.I. May 14, 1971).   
54 Women of Mass. v. Quinn, Civ. No. 71-2420-W (Nov. 1, 1971). 
55 Ryan v. Specter, 321 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Pa. 1971). 
56 For the organizers’ reflections on strategy, see Women vs. Connecticut, Some Thoughts 
on Strategy, in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, at 163-77. 
57 Excerpts from the pamphlet, as well as a strategy memo from the organizers of the 
suit, are republished in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, at 163-77.  To this point, I 
have not located a copy of the plaintiffs’ brief. 
58 1860 Conn. Pub. Acts 65-66.  The provisions of the statute are discussed in Abele.  
Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 801 (1972). 
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limit the size of our families.  We are pressured to use contraceptives or 
be sterilized. . . . 
. . . .   
 We want control over our own bodies.  We are tired of being pressured 
to have children or not to have children.  It’s our decision.59  
Movement lawyers were emphatic: “We are arguing that all women should 
have the freedom to choose, and that they not be penalized whatever the choice 
is – to bear the child or to abort.”60 
Thus, the movement sought relief from government control of women’s 
decisions, and more: it sought transformation of the social understandings and 
arrangements that pressured women to bear children, and to forbear from 
bearing children.  It challenged these social understandings and arrangements 
in a demand for reproductive justice that linked demands for abortion rights 
and childcare.  Motherhood itself was not a harm; instead, the problem was the 
way the society treated mothers:  
Women must not be forced into personal and economic dependence on 
men or on degrading jobs in order to assure adequate care for the children 
they bear.  Our decisions to bear children cannot be freely made if we 
know that aid in child care is not forthcoming and that we will be solely 
responsible for the daily care of our children.61  
The recruitment pamphlet presented these everyday understandings about 
the social conditions of motherhood as injuries of constitutional magnitude.  
Under the heading “right to life, liberty, and property,” the organizers pointed 
out that imposition of forced motherhood was so great it shaped the lives of 
women even when they were not pregnant, teaching women and their society 
to see all women as potentially pregnant.62  The pamphlet’s account of how 
unwanted motherhood affected women repeatedly emphasized society’s 
responsibility for motherhood’s adverse effects on women: 
Unmarried women who become pregnant and are forced to bear children 
against their will suffer an extreme deprivation of liberty and human 
dignity by the social stigma placed on them as unwed mothers. 
 
59 WOMEN VS. CONNECTICUT RECRUITMENT PAMPHLET 2 (1970), reprinted in 
GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, at 168-69. 
60 See Goodman, Schoenbrod & Stearns, supra note 42, at 35 (conversing about forms of 
pressure or coercion of concern to the feminist movement in the immediate aftermath of 
Roe). 
61 WOMEN VS. CONNECTICUT RECRUITMENT PAMPHLET, supra note 59, at 169.  
62 Id. at 173 (“In Connecticut, the actuality of an unwanted pregnancy, or the possibility 
of such a pregnancy, severely limits a woman’s liberty and freedom to engage in the 
political process, to choose her own profession, and to fulfill herself in any way which does 
not relate to the bearing and raising of children.”); see also id. at 174 (“Women also suffer 
loss of property in that they are denied jobs solely on the basis of possible pregnancy, or 
motherhood.”). 
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 . . . Pregnant women are forced to leave their jobs without 
compensation and without any guarantee of returning to work after they 
give birth.   
 Women who are forced to bear children they cannot support suffer 
extreme economic hardship.  Because there are few facilities for child 
care outside the home, these women are effectively excluded from 
seeking employment and are forced to rely on welfare or charities to help 
in raising their children, at a loss to their liberty and independence in 
economic matters.63 
These arguments, emphasizing gender inequalities in the conditions in which 
children are conceived and raised, were offered as illustrations of how abortion 
law deprived women of liberty and property.  The equal protection argument, 
advanced at a time when there was no heightened scrutiny for sex 
discrimination, addressed the ways in which criminal abortion laws 
discriminated between rich women, who “can afford to travel to London or 
Puerto Rico for abortions” and poor women, who could not.64  The litigation in 
Connecticut, as in other states, emphasized the ways in which the social 
organization of motherhood varied across lines of socioeconomic class and 
race,65 and argued that the criminalization of abortion specially harmed poor 
and minority women.66   
 
63 Id. at 173-74.  
64 Id. at 174.  Other arguments in the pamphlet included claims in Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, Unconstitutionally Vague, Right to Freedom of Religion, Right to Free Speech, 
and Lack of State Interest.  The pamphlet speaks of continuing to work on a Thirteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendment argument.  Id. at 174-76.  
65 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 49. 
66 See supra text accompanying note 63.  The suit’s recruitment pamphlet emphasized 
that wealthy women “have greater opportunity to learn of private New York hospitals that 
perform abortions for out-of-state women at fees of $500-600.  Thus, Connecticut’s abortion 
law places a much heavier burden on poor women, who cannot afford the prices charged by 
hospitals in New York for therapeutic abortions . . . .”  WOMEN VS. CONNECTICUT 
RECRUITMENT PAMPHLET, supra note 59, at 174.  
Litigation in other states emphasized the racial and economic disparities of abortion 
restrictions.  See, e.g., Complaint at 6, Women of Mass. v. Quinn, Civ. No. 71-2420-W (D. 
Mass. Nov. 1, 1971) [hereinafter Quinn Complaint] (“[Poor women] without economic 
means are unable to procure psychiatric and medical evaluations that are necessary to obtain 
‘legal’ abortions in Massachusetts, thus violating the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws.”); Brief of Plaintiff at 12, Ryan v. Specter, 321 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Pa. 
1971) (No. 70-2527) (“[B]y far the most disasterous [sic] effect of this comfortable and 
closely guarded monopoly [on therapeutic abortions] is the fact that it makes safe medical 
abortions unavailable to most women of low income, and consequently condemns them to 
choose between bearing an unwanted child and risking a self-induced abortion or an 
abortion at the hands of an unqualified practitioner.”); id. (discussing data in New York City 
that showed that half of the women who died from bungled abortions in 1960-1962 were 
non-white women, but 92.7% of women granted therapeutic abortions were white); id. at 13 
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In fact, the organizing pamphlet for Women vs. Connecticut invoked a 
variety of clauses of the Constitution as authority for its claim that criminal 
abortion statutes violated women’s constitutional rights.  The pamphlet 
asserted that the Connecticut abortion statute violated women’s rights under 
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and announced that a Nineteenth Amendment argument was 
under development.67  Appeal to these many forms of constitutional authority 
was a regular part of the movement’s multi-plaintiff cases challenging criminal 
abortion statutes.  The suits expressed wide-ranging challenge to the conditions 
in which women conceived and raised children as they argued that abortion 
restrictions (1) violated women’s right to life,68 and liberty,69 under the 
Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violated women’s right to equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment;70 (3) violated poor women’s right to equal 
 
(“[T]he inevitable effect of the statute has been systematically to deny safe medical 
abortions to the poor, Negroes, and Puerto Ricans. . . .  The law operates in a socio-
economic environment which could lead to no other results.”); First Amended Complaint at 
6, Women of R.I. v. Israel, No. 4605 (D.R.I. May 14, 1971) (“[I]n their application, [the 
laws] affect least those with the money and contacts to afford and obtain a legal abortion . . . ; 
a legal abortion out of the State; or at least a safe and discreet illegal abortion.  Most women 
who die or become seriously ill or sterile from unsafe self abortions, or illegal abortions, are 
poor women.”); see also Complaint at 15, Abramowitz v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 
1972) (No. 431-70) [hereinafter Abramowitz Complaint] (employing the same language 
used in the Rhode Island complaint to challenge the socioeconomic effect of New Jersey’s 
laws).  In the wake of Roe, movement lawyers focused on the kinds of suits that would be 
necessary to ensure that Medicaid covered abortions and to ensure that poor women and 
women of color were protected against involuntary sterilization.  See Goodman, Schoenbrod 
& Stearns, supra note 42, at 31, 35. 
67 WOMEN VS. CONNECTICUT RECRUITMENT PAMPHLET, supra note 59, at 173-76; see also 
Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1123 (2d Cir. 1971). 
68
 Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 44, at 13, 15.  The New York suit argued that women’s 
right to life was violated on the grounds that childbirth involved a risk of death, that many 
women seeking to avoid pregnancy were forced to “expose themselves to the known and as 
yet unknown dangers of the pill even though they would prefer not to,” and that the statute 
criminalizing abortion drove women seeking abortions “into the hands of often unskilled 
and unscrupulous persons directly in the face of the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Id. 
69 Id. at 16-25.  The New York brief detailed numerous ways in which childbearing 
infringed upon the liberty of women: The law permitted, and in some cases encouraged, 
employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and motherhood, inhibiting women’s 
liberty to work.  Schools frequently required pregnant students to withdraw.  Unmarried 
women could be forced to marry by the social stigma of unwed motherhood and the 
economic requirements of a society where mothers were often refused employment.  The 
brief argued that the decision whether to bear children and to bear the constraints the status 
of motherhood imposed was an aspect of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.   
70 The New York brief challenges the sexual “double standard,” arguing that while 
women and men are equally responsible for the act of sexual intercourse, “[s]hould the 
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protection under the Fourteenth Amendment;71 (4) violated women’s right to 
privacy as protected by the Ninth Amendment;72 (5) violated the Eighth 
Amendment, by imposing motherhood on women for engaging in sex, a form 
of cruel and unusual punishment;73 (6) violated the Thirteenth Amendment as a 
form of involuntary servitude;74 and (7) violated the Nineteenth Amendment 
 
woman accidentally become pregnant . . . she endures in many instances the entire burden or 
‘punishment.’”  Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 44, at 35-36.  The brief argues that this violates 
equal protection of the laws by putting women, and only women, “into a position in which 
they will be subjected to a whole range of de facto types of discrimination based on the 
status of motherhood” that will last for much longer than the mere nine months of 
pregnancy.  Id. at 37.  
71 In New Jersey, the plaintiffs argued that the statutes particularly deprived poor women 
of equal protection of the law: “The abortion laws affect all women adversely, but in their 
application, affect least those with the money and contacts to afford and obtain a legal 
abortion in New Jersey . . . .  Thus, they deprive poor women of the equal protection of the 
laws . . . .”  Abramowitz Complaint, supra note 66, at 15.  The Pennsylvania case also made 
an equal protection argument on behalf of poor women: “Wealthy women enter the front 
door [of the hospital] armed with the results of expensive psychiatric consultation. . . .  The 
poor woman enters the hospital through the back door, often on the verge of death.”  Brief 
of Plaintiff, supra note 66, at 14.  The Pennsylvania brief argues that the state has 
“consciously adopted and retained an abortion statute which inexorably leads to systematic 
socio-economic discrimination.”  Id. at 48. 
72 In New York, the plaintiffs’ brief stated that a woman’s “control of her own body – the 
decision concerning whether she will or she will not bear a child – must be her own private 
decision.  This private decision is inextricably linked to a woman’s right of liberty to control 
her life and with her privacy of association.”  Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 44, at 45.  The 
Rhode Island Complaint argued that women seeking abortions, who are fighting for “their 
constitutional right to self-determination,” were forced by the state’s statute to  
expose their most intimate concerns to anyone whom they think might aid them.  They 
must become involved in the furtive and sordid underground which the laws against 
abortion create.  Thus, the abortion laws operate to degrade women in their own eyes 
and in the eyes of others.  All this violates the right of privacy which is guaranteed by 
the Ninth Amendment and which is a penumbra of the first ten amendments.   
First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at 5.   
73 In her New Women Lawyers amicus brief in Roe, Nancy Stearns argued:  
Forcing a woman to bear a child against her will is indeed a form of punishment, a 
result of society’s ambivalent attitude towards female sexuality.  The existence of the 
sexual “double standard” has created the social response that when a woman becomes 
pregnant accidentally, she must be “punished” for her transgression, particularly if she 
is single.  This punishment falls solely on the woman. . . .  The man equally responsible 
for the pregnancy faces no such punishment. . . .  The Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects all persons against the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishment.” 
Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers et al. at 34-35, Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18).  On the sexual double standard, see generally Keith Thomas, 
The Double Standard, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 195 (1959).   
74 The Massachusetts case argued that the state’s statute constituted involuntary servitude 
in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment by forcing women to “spent a major portion of 
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by forcing women to become mothers while organizing the core activities of 
citizenship to exclude caregivers.75 
The organizers of the Connecticut case recruited 858 individual female 
plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of the state’s abortion statute.  To 
make clear that “it was women whose cause they were defending – not 
members of the medical profession,”76 and to illustrate concretely the harms 
that the abortion statute inflicted on individual women, the organizers made 
large charts detailing each plaintiff’s experiences with abortion.  The 
organizers indicated, as to each plaintiff, whether she reported complications 
from illegal abortion, sexual inhibition, compelled pregnancy, pressure to early 
marriage, as well as physical, emotional, and financial problems from 
unwanted pregnancy.77  
The action proved remarkably successful in communicating with the 
judiciary the social meaning and consequences of forced motherhood for 
women.  A three-judge panel invalidated Connecticut’s criminal abortion 
statute over strenuous dissent, with Judge Edmund Lumbard writing an opinion 
recognizing the “extraordinary ramifications” of motherhood for women,78 and 
 
their lifetime bearing and rearing unwanted children to the necessary exclusion of other 
endeavors.”  Quinn Complaint, supra note 66, at 7; see also Brief for Human Rights for 
Women, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 34. 
75 The Rhode Island Complaint stated: 
[T]he Nineteenth Amendment sought to reverse the previous inferior social and 
political position of women: denial of the vote represented maintenance of the 
dividing line between women as part of the family organization only and women as 
independent and equal citizens in American life.  The Nineteenth Amendment 
recognized that women are legally free to take part in activity outside the home.  But 
the abortion laws imprison women in the home without free individual choice.  The 
abortion laws, in their real practical effects, deny the liberty and equality of women 
to participate in the wider world, an equality which is demanded by the Nineteenth 
Amendment. 
First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at 6-7. 
76 Kesselman, supra note 51, at 53.  
77 Women vs. Connecticut Organizing Charts (1970) (on file with author).  The charts 
indicated whether the plaintiff had (1) previously received an abortion; (2) suffered 
physical, emotional, or financial complications from an illegal abortion; (3) used previous 
methods of birth control (including the type of birth control and any complications); (4) 
used the Pill despite adverse reaction or doctor’s advice; (5) ever felt sexually inhibited; (6) 
married early because of unplanned pregnancy; (7) continued a pregnancy because of the 
illegality of abortion; (8) given up a child for adoption; (9) suffered physical, emotional or 
financial problems from an unwanted pregnancy; (10) been denied an abortion in 
Connecticut; and (11) been provided (or was currently being providing) abortion counseling.  
Id.  Finally, the chart indicated whether the plaintiff was willing to testify in the case.  Id.   
78 Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 801-02 (D. Conn. 1972) (“The decision to carry 
and bear a child has extraordinary ramifications for a woman.  Pregnancy entails profound 
physical changes.  Childbirth presents some danger to life and health.  Bearing and raising a 
child demands difficult psychological and social adjustments.  The working or student 
mother frequently must curtail or end her employment or educational opportunities.  The 
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reasoning that, in view of the “changed role of women in society and the 
changed attitudes toward them,”79 retaining control over child-bearing 
decisions was of fundamental importance to women.  Judge Jon Newman 
focused on the ways the statute violated women’s “right to privacy in family 
and sexual matters.”80  Newman’s concurring opinion weighed evidence 
suggesting that the century-old statute might have been enacted for the purpose 
of “deterring fornication” and “inhibiting non-procreative sexual relations,”81 
as well as for protecting women from what was then an unsafe medical 
procedure.  Unable to find evidence that protecting unborn life was a reason 
for the ban’s enactment, Judge Newman concluded that protecting a woman’s 
health and morals was not sufficient reason to sustain a law burdening a 
woman’s constitutional liberties, when medical advances had eliminated risks 
abortion once posed.82 
Upon learning that the state’s criminal abortion statute had been struck 
down with one judge questioning whether the statute had a fetal-protective 
purpose, Governor Thomas Meskill called a special session of the Connecticut 
legislature to enact a new law with a preamble stating that the purpose of the 
law was to protect the fetus.   
The plaintiffs’ lawyer, Roraback, and other participants in the case attended 
the legislative hearing to voice their opposition to the newly proposed abortion 
law.83  Roraback’s statement to the legislature on behalf of the plaintiffs in 
Women vs. Connecticut indicated that the number of named plaintiffs in the 
case continued to grow.  Responding to the Governor’s proposal to reinstate 
the statute in order to protect the unborn, Roraback emphasized the ways 
women were treated when pregnant – conditions for which the society as a 
whole was responsible.  She stated, in part: 
 We are here to speak as women on behalf of the 1,700 women in 
Connecticut who join together to strike down the ban on abortion in this 
State. . . .  Probably nothing but death itself can affect a woman [sic] life 
more seriously than enforce [sic] bearing of children and enforced 
responsibility for them perhaps for the remainder of her and their lives. . . 
 
mother with an unwanted child may find that it overtaxes her and her family’s financial or 
emotional resources.  The unmarried mother will suffer the stigma of having an illegitimate 
child.  Thus, determining whether or not to bear a child is of fundamental importance to a 
woman.”). 
79 Id. at 802.  
80 Id. at 805 (Newman, J., concurring).  
81 Id. at 808-09. 
82 Id. at 810 (“Because I believe the only interests which the 1860 legislature was 
seeking to advance are not today sufficient to justify invasion of the plaintiff’s 
constitutionally protected rights, I join with Judge Lumbard in holding these statutes 
unconstitutional.”). 
83 Excerpts from the legislative hearing on the new law are reprinted in GREENHOUSE & 
SIEGEL, supra note *, at 184-91.  
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.  Even before childbirth, she will probably lose her employment, at least 
temporarily, and during that lay-off she is not entitled to receive 
unemployment compensation benefits. . . .  Afterwards, the woman that 
has given birth to a child will find her employment opportunities severely 
limited. 
. . . . 
 . . . The interruption of her education and training, for whatever reason 
and whatever level, places her and her family at a permanent 
disadvantage . . . . 
. . . .  
 The real question . . . is not whether abortions will be performed. . . .  
[It] is who will perform them and how they will be done – by a trained 
doctor in a clean medical facility or by a dirty old man in a back room.84 
Despite a wide-ranging speak-out at the hearing, the legislature reenacted 
the abortion statute.  Roraback and her fellow attorneys sued – now with over 
2000 named plaintiffs85 – to enjoin enforcement of the new law, and the new 
law was struck down in an opinion authored by Judge Jon Newman that 
squarely addressed the relation of claims about women and the unborn, and 
proposed a viability framework as a basis for reconciling the two.86  The state 
of Connecticut appealed the decision invalidating its statute, but the case was 
intercepted by the Roe decision itself. 
III. HOW WOMEN VS. CONNECTICUT IS VISIBLE, AND EFFACED, IN ROE 
Both Abele opinions are notable for their influence on Roe.  Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion in Roe employs the viability framework set forth in Judge 
Jon Newman’s opinion as a way of coordinating the abortion right and the 
state’s interest in protecting potential life.87  
But the influence of Abele on Roe is deeper, helping to establish that 
women’s interest in retaining control over the decision whether to become a 
mother is of constitutional magnitude.  Roe was argued twice; in its earliest 
drafts the opinion seems to have been conceived of as an opinion invalidating 
 
84 Hearing on Abortion Before the J. Comm. Pub. Health and Safety, 1972 Leg., Spec. 
Sess., 18-23 (Conn. 1972) (statement of Catherine Roraback), reprinted in GREENHOUSE & 
SIEGEL, supra note *, at 186-87. 
85 Kesselman, supra note 51, at 59.  
86 See Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227, 232 (D. Conn. 1972). 
87 See generally Andrew D. Hurwitz, Jon O. Newman and the Abortion Decisions: A 
Remarkable First Year, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 231 (2002).  Interestingly enough, it seems 
to have been a Justice Powell clerk who was sufficiently attached to the reasoning of Judge 
Newman’s opinion that he continued to press for revisions expanding the scope of the right 
in accordance with it.  Id. at 244. 
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the Texas abortion statute on vagueness grounds.88  Between the first and 
second argument of the case, challenges to abortion statutes on the women’s 
rights model, ongoing in multiple jurisdictions, seem to have communicated 
that criminal abortion statutes inflicted harms on women of constitutional 
magnitude, gravity, and fundamentality.89  In the wake of Roe, Nancy Stearns 
reflected: 
I don’t think we can possibly underestimate how much women have 
taught judges, lawyers and the public generally on the women’s rights 
issues . . . .  I mean they really did not understand women’s rights claims 
and they certainly did not understand how serious it was to a woman to 
have an unwanted child. . . .  I must stress that I think this progression 
was largely due to the strategy of bringing women’s rights cases.  I don’t 
think we could have educated the judges the same way in pure doctors’ 
lawsuits.90 
More specifically, Abele itself seems to have shaped Roe’s account of the 
harms of criminal abortion statutes.91  Years later, Nancy Stearns, the lawyer 
 
88 LINDA J. GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME 
COURT JOURNEY 87-88 (2005); Hurwitz, supra note 87, at 240.   
89 For Stearns’ amicus brief in Roe, see Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women 
Lawyers et al., supra note 73.  Other multi-plaintiff challenges to abortion statutes filed at 
this time with which she was associated include: Quinn Complaint, supra note 66; 
Complaint, YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972) (No. 264-70); Complaint, 
Ryan v. Specter, 321 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Pa. 1971) (No. 70-2527); First Amended Complaint, 
supra note 66.  
90 Goodman, Schoenbrod & Stearns, supra note 42, at 24.   
91 Abele offered this account of harm:   
The decision to carry and bear a child has extraordinary ramifications for a woman.  
Pregnancy entails profound physical changes.  Childbirth presents some danger to life 
and health.  Bearing and raising a child demands difficult psychological and social 
adjustments.  The working or student mother frequently must curtail or end her 
employment or educational opportunities.  The mother with an unwanted child may 
find that it overtaxes her and her family’s financial or emotional resources.  The 
unmarried mother will suffer the stigma of having an illegitimate child.  Thus, 
determining whether or not to bear a child is of fundamental importance to a woman. 
Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 801-02 (D. Conn. 1972) (citations omitted).  Roe 
famously observed:  
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District 
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is 
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.  The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by 
denying this choice altogether is apparent.  Specific and direct harm medically 
diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.  Maternity, or additional 
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.  Psychological harm 
may be imminent.  Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.  There is 
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the 
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and 
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who worked on the multi-plaintiff movement cases observed: “Justice 
Blackmun’s description of the physical and emotional harm to women of an 
unwanted pregnancy, the stigma of an out-of-wed-lock pregnancy, and the 
problems associated with bearing an unwanted child bears a striking 
resemblance to the language used by the Connecticut court.”92  
Whereas in 1971 in United States v. Vuitch93 the Supreme Court rejected a 
doctor’s void for vagueness challenge to the District of Columbia’s abortion 
statute in a decision that refused to address the constitutional liberties of the 
doctors patients,94 in 1973 it struck down Texas’s and Georgia’s abortion 
statutes as violating women’s right to privacy grounded in the “Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty.”95  The movement’s account of how 
criminal abortion statutes injured women seems to have changed the Court’s 
understanding of the law sufficiently to extend protection of the liberty right 
recognized in its contraception cases to the case of abortion.96  In reviewing the 
history of criminal abortion statutes, Justice Blackmun queried whether the 
state had an interest in enforcing morals by law sufficient to justify the 
imposition on women’s liberty, citing to opinions arising out of cases that the 
feminist movement brought in Connecticut and New Jersey, including Judge 
Newman’s opinion in Abele.97  
But, as Linda Greenhouse has emphasized, even though amicus briefs in 
Roe “were filled with the new feminist discourse of women’s rights,” there was 
a “disconnect between what the Court heard in Roe and what it chose to say.”98  
 
otherwise, to care for it.  In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and 
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.  All these are factors the 
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113, 153 (1973).   
92 Nancy Stearns, Commentary: Roe v. Wade: Our Struggle Continues, 4 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5 (1988-90).  It is clear from Stearns’s article that she is referring to 
Lumbard’s opinion – she makes this claim directly after quoting Lumbard’s statement that 
“determining whether or not to bear a child is of fundamental importance to a woman.”  
Abele, 342 F. Supp. at 802. 
93 402 U.S. 62 (1971).  
94 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
95 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  
96 See Goodman, Schoenbrod & Stearns, supra note 42, at 27 (observing that at the time 
the Court handed down Roe, the Justices “knew that they had at least ten other cases logged 
in the Court . . . with probably ten different stages of pregnancy plus cases all over the 
United States on behalf of doctors, non-medical people, counselors, and on behalf of all 
sorts of folks”).  
97 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 148 & n.42. 
98 Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of 
a Shifting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 45-46 (2008).  Multiple briefs making 
feminist claims for the abortion right were filed, including the brief on the merits.  See Brief 
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers et al., supra note 73, at 8, 25, 34; Brief 
of American Ass’n of University Women et al. as Amicus Curia Supporting Appellants at 
23, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (Nos. 70-18 & 70-14) (arguing that unwanted pregnancies sharply 
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Roe was at best a transitional decision that straddled the medical and women’s 
rights models.  Women’s advocacy helped establish women as constitutional 
rights holders who are entitled to make decisions about sex and parenting 
without control by the state – but Roe gave only confused expression to this 
right.  Consider the following passage, which illustrates how Roe teeters 
between the women’s rights and medical model:  
 In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, 
Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.  
. . . . 
 This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior 
to this “compelling” point, the attending physician, in consultation with 
his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in 
his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.  If 
that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion 
free of interference by the State. 
. . . .  
 . . . The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer 
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points 
where important state interests provide compelling justifications for 
intervention.  Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is 
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for 
it must rest with the physician.  If an individual practitioner abuses the 
privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, 
judicial and intra-professional, are available.99 
By contrast, compare a key passage from Judge Lumbard’s initial opinion 
invalidating the Connecticut abortion statute, which reveals how far beyond the 
medical model this district court judge moved, and how many of the critical 
 
decrease “the value of the present right to vote, to equal pay, to equal job opportunities, to 
choose one’s marriage partner, to joint custody of children”); Brief of California Committee 
to Legalize Abortion et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 5, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 
(Nos. 70-18 & 70-14) (arguing that abortion restrictions enslaved women’s bodies and 
thereby violated the Thirteenth Amendment as a form of involuntary servitude); Brief on the 
Merits for Appellants at 106, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (Nos. 70-18 & 70-14) (arguing that abortion 
restrictions force women to “endure economic and social hardships”).  
99 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-66 (emphasis added); see also Kristin Booth Glen, Abortion in 
the Courts: A Laywoman’s Historical Guide to the New Disaster Area, 4 FEMINIST STUD. 1, 
9 (1978) (“[T]he Supreme Court was not upholding a woman’s right to determine whether to 
bear a child, as abortion proponents and feminists had argued.  Instead, it was upholding a 
doctor’s right to make a medical decision!”); Greenhouse, supra note 98, at 42 (“To modern 
ears, regardless of one’s opinion about the acceptability of abortion, Roe’s paternalistic 
assumption that doctors (always male, evidently) know what is best for their female patients 
sounds archaic.  Those who expound upon Roe without ever having read it . . . might be 
surprised to find that the decision is much more a doctor’s bill of rights than it is a feminist 
manifesto.”).  
 1898 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1875 
 
predicates of the feminist claim he internalized.  After describing the harms 
that coerced motherhood inflicts on women,100 Judge Lumbard explained that 
women’s social status and social role had changed since the state’s criminal 
abortion statute was first enacted, and suggested that the law’s imposition on 
women – which was once reasonable – was no longer so: 
 The Connecticut anti-abortion laws take from women the power to 
determine whether or not to have a child once conception has occurred.  
In 1860, when these statutes were enacted in their present form, women 
had few rights.  Since then, however, their status in our society has 
changed dramatically.  From being wholly excluded from political 
matters, they have secured full access to the political arena.  From the 
home, they have moved into industry; now some 30 million women 
comprise forty percent of the work force.  And as women’s roles have 
changed, so have societal attitudes.  The recently passed equal rights 
statute and the pending equal rights amendment demonstrate that society 
now considers women the equal of men.101 
In this brief paragraph, penned before Justice Brennan made the case for 
extending heightened scrutiny to sex discrimination in Frontiero v. 
Richardson,102 Judge Lumbard reasoned that constitutional protection for 
women’s decision whether to abort a pregnancy was warranted because of 
changing social views about women’s “status” and “roles,” citing the 
Nineteenth Amendment conferring on women the right to vote, the first equal 
protection sex discrimination decision, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
(as amended in 1972 when Congress insisted on equal enforcement of sex as 
well as race provisions of the federal employment discrimination law), and the 
ERA.103  Given changing social understanding of women’s “status” and 
“roles,” Judge Lumbard decided that the state’s interest in protecting the 
unborn was not sufficient reason to take away from women all control over the 
decision whether to become a mother:  
The state has argued that the statutes may be justified as attempts to 
balance the rights of the fetus against the rights of the woman.  While the 
Connecticut courts have not so construed the statutes, we accept this 
characterization as one fairly drawn from the face of the statutes.  
Nevertheless we hold that the state’s interest in striking this balance as it 
 
100 See sources cited supra note 91.  
101 Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Conn. 1972) (citations omitted).  
102 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
103 Abele, 342 F. Supp at 802.  Judge Lumbard does not expressly cite the Equal 
Protection Clause; instead he cites Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the first equal 
protection decision to strike down a law on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of 
sex – a case litigated by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  See Reply Brief for Appellant, Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).  
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has is insufficient to warrant removing from the woman all 
decisionmaking power over whether to terminate a pregnancy.104 
Roe lacks language of this kind.  There is no language in Roe 
acknowledging that statutes criminalizing abortion were enacted in the 
nineteenth century at the height of the separate spheres tradition when women 
were denied the right to vote and restricted in the forms of employment 
allowed outside the home.  There is no language in Roe suggesting that 
society’s changing attitudes toward women – of the kind manifest in the 
Nineteenth Amendment, Title VII, Reed (the first equal protection-sex 
discrimination case),105 and the ERA – warranted a change in the 
constitutionality of criminal abortion statutes.  And there is no language in Roe 
suggesting that, given these changes, the state’s interest in protecting the 
unborn was not sufficient to take from women all control over the decision 
whether to become a mother.  Only indirectly does Roe acknowledge that laws 
criminalizing abortion present questions of sexual freedom for women.106   
Instead Roe bases women’s right to make the abortion decision free of state 
interference on the constitutional value of privacy, and recognizes a state 
interest in regulating the abortion decision that grows with the pregnancy 
itself,107 in an opinion that reasons within the medical model as much as the 
women’s rights model.  In passage after passage, Roe explains the basis of the 
abortion right in physiology, medical science, the physician-patient 
 
104 Abele, 342 F. Supp. at 802-03.  
105 See sources cited supra note 103. 
106 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
107 Roe v. Wade, 411 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (“The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in 
her privacy.  She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions 
of the developing young in the human uterus.  See Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 
478-479, 547 (24th ed. 1965).  The situation therefore is inherently different from marital 
intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or 
education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and 
Meyer were respectively concerned.  As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and 
appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of 
the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved.  The woman’s 
privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured 
accordingly.”).  For an account of the “physiological naturalism” that shapes Roe’s 
reasoning, as well as the equal protection sex discrimination cases of this era, see Reva B. 
Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 274 (1992) (“Because Roe and its 
progeny treat pregnancy as a physiological problem, they obscure the extent to which the 
community that would regulate a woman’s reproductive choices is in fact implicated in 
them, responsible for defining motherhood in ways that impose material deprivations and 
dignitary injuries on those who perform its work. . . .  Roe’s account of the abortion decision 
invites criticism of the abortion right as an instrument of feminine expedience . . . because it 
presents the burdens of motherhood as woman’s destiny and dilemma – a condition for 
which no other social actor bears responsibility.”). 
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relationship, and doctors’ prerogatives to make medical judgments free of state 
interference,108 without relating constraints on government control of women’s 
decisions about motherhood to a new understanding of women’s status and 
role.   
CONCLUSION: DANGEROUS REASONS – EQUALITY’S REPRESSION AND 
EXPRESSION AS A BASIS FOR THE ABORTION RIGHT  
What factors contributed to equality’s repression and expression as a basis 
for the abortion right?  In the era of Roe, there were both political and legal 
forces that combined to efface sex equality as a normative basis for the 
abortion right; over time, these constraints have begun to relax, and equality-
based reasoning has come to increasing prominence in the case law. 
Both cultural and political forces would seem to explain the predominance 
of medical talk over women’s rights talk in Roe.  At the time of Roe, Congress 
had sent the ERA to the states; the Justices had scarcely decided any sex 
discrimination cases, and, while responsive, were plainly only beginning to 
comprehend the nature of the movement’s claims.109  To the extent they did, 
the Justices nonetheless employed professional frames to justify the abortion 
right rather than the more politically provocative women’s rights frame, which 
called into question norms governing sex and family life.  That the women’s 
rights frame was politically provocative was becoming clear.  In the several 
years before Roe, the women’s movement’s sex equality claims for abortion 
rights had already begun to prompt backlash.  Phyllis Schlafly’s first published 
attack on the ERA in February of 1972 – a year before Roe was handed down – 
characterized the women’s movement as “anti-family, anti-children, and 
proabortion,” in an attack that condemned abortion as an evil associated with 
“free sex” and “day-care centers”: 
Women’s lib is a total assault on the role of the American woman as wife 
and mother and on the family as the basic unit of society.   
 Women’s libbers are trying to make wives and mothers unhappy with 
their career, make them feel that they are “second-class citizens” and 
“abject slaves.”  Women’s libbers are promoting free sex instead of the 
“slavery” of marriage.  They are promoting Federal “day-care centers” for 
 
108 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 99.  Despite the urgings of one of Justice 
Powell’s law clerks to recognize the woman’s interest in the medical decision, Blackmun’s 
opinion ignores the fact that “women, not their doctors, are the central actors in the human 
drama of pregnancy and reproductive decision-making.”  Greenhouse, supra note 98, at 41-
42. 
109 For one account that traces the relation between the ERA and abortion debates, see 
Siegel, supra note 28, at 1389-403. 
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babies instead of homes.  They are promoting abortions instead of 
families.110 
Schlafly mobilized opposition to the ERA by talking about the women’s 
movement as a threat to traditional family roles.  As importantly, she 
mobilized opposition by framing abortion and homosexuality as potent 
symbols of the new family form that the ERA would promote – insisting that 
ratification of the ERA would constitutionalize both abortion and gay rights.111  
These claims proved so powerful in energizing opposition to the ERA that 
architects of the New Right borrowed them, emphasizing abortion and gay 
rights as threats to faith and the traditional family form in order to mobilize the 
pan-Christian movement that helped drive the Republican revival in the late 
1970s.112  As I have elsewhere shown, with conservative backlash burgeoning, 
feminists came to rely on privacy reasoning as a way to separate the ERA 
from their support for abortion and gay rights, until the women’s movement 
abandoned hope of the ERA’s ratification in the 1980s.113 
But it was not only backlash against the women’s movement that made 
equality arguments for abortion rights more difficult to assert.  The growth of 
constitutional law effaced equality as a basis for reproductive rights.  In 1973, 
Roe expressed the abortion right as a form of liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause, never mentioning equal protection or reasons rooted in sex 
equality; and Frontiero v. Richardson114 stated the case for equal protection 
scrutiny of sex-based state action without mentioning laws regulating 
reproduction.  In 1974, Geduldig v. Aiello115 rejected arguments that laws 
discriminating against pregnant women reflect sex stereotyping and held that, 
for equal protection purposes, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not 
necessarily the same as discrimination on the basis of sex.116  The Court 
followed in 1977 by holding in Maher v. Roe117 that Connecticut could prohibit 
Medicaid funding for elective abortions because the state law “involves no 
discrimination against a suspect class.  An indigent woman desiring an 
 
110 Phyllis Schlafly, What’s Wrong with “Equal Rights” for Women, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY 
REP., Feb. 1972, at 1, 4.  A subsection of Schlafly’s article, entitled “Women’s Libbers DO 
NOT Speak for Us,” is reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, at 218-20.  
111 Siegel, supra note 28, at 1392-93.  As Rosemary Thomson, an organizer for Schlafly, 
warned in The Price of Liberty: “The national leaders of the women’s movement, who were 
working so hard to ratify ERA, were the same clique promoting homosexual rights, 
abortion, and government child rearing.”  ROSEMARY THOMSON, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY 15 
(1978).  
112 See GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note *, at 257-59; Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 
415-23. 
113 Siegel, supra note 28, at 1395.  
114 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
115 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
116 Id. at 497 n.20.  
117 432 U.S. 464 (1977).  
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abortion does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so 
recognized by our cases.”118  In Harris v. McRae119 the Court ruled that 
funding restrictions of this kind deserved no special scrutiny120 and were 
presumptively benign, “rationally related to the legitimate governmental 
objective of protecting potential life.”121  In this framework, the sex equality 
argument for reproductive rights was not only politically provocative; it was 
legally unintelligible. 
But times change.  While Roe, Frontiero, Geduldig, Maher, and McRae 
remain good law, the constitutional framework they established continues to 
evolve, and in ways that make the sex equality claim increasingly visible and 
important as a normative basis for the abortion right.  
Developments in Equal Protection Law.  Since the mid-1970s we have 
grown to recognize the forms of sex discrimination directed at pregnant 
women.  When the Court first interpreted federal employment discrimination 
law on the premise that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination, 
Congress objected and enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment 
(“PDA”) to Title VII.122  Years of litigation under the PDA illustrated the 
many forms of sex discrimination pregnant women face.  Recently the Court 
drew upon the understandings forged in nearly three decades of PDA litigation 
when Chief Justice Rehnquist held in Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs123 that the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) was a 
valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the FMLA deterred and remedied sex stereotyping in the treatment of 
new mothers and mothers-to-be in the workplace.124 
 
118 Id. at 470-71.  
119 448 U.S. 297 (1980).  
120 Id. at 323 (“[T]his court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone is not a 
suspect classification.”). 
121 Id. at 325.  
122 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).  
123 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
124 Hibbs presents Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment, and the FMLA 
as remedies for a pattern of unconstitutional conduct involving discrimination against 
“women when they are mothers and mothers-to-be” – a form of bias it understands to be at 
the root of sex discrimination.  See id. at 736-37.  Hibbs notes that Congress determined that 
“[h]istorically, denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has been 
traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and workers 
second.  This prevailing ideology about women’s roles has in turn justified discrimination 
against women when they are mothers or mothers-to-be.”  Id. at 736.  The Court continued: 
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes 
presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.  Because employers continued 
to regard the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar 
accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave.  These mutually reinforcing 
stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to 
continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ 
stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.  
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Developments in Substantive Due Process Law.  During these same several 
decades, sex equality arguments have been articulated – inside substantive due 
process law – as the Court has defended Roe, first in American College of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh125 and then in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey.126  The joint opinion in Casey does not invoke equal 
protection as clausal authority for the abortion right, but it repeatedly invokes 
the conceptual repertoire of sex equality arguments to justify the abortion 
right.127  Consider the language in which the joint opinion in Casey reaffirms 
constitutional protection for the abortion right: 
Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without 
more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that 
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.  The destiny 
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of 
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.128 
Precisely as it reaffirms the abortion right the joint opinion summons the 
understanding that the state cannot impose “its own vision of the woman’s 
role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and 
our culture.”129  The opinion ties constitutional protection for women’s 
abortion decision to the understanding, forged in the Court’s sex discrimination 
cases, that government cannot use law to enforce traditional sex roles on 
women.  
 
Those perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to subtle discrimination that may 
be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis. 
Id.  See generally Reva B. Siegel, “You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby”: Rehnquist’s New 
Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871 (2006). 
125 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1985) (“Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution 
embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely 
beyond the reach of government. . . .  That promise extends to women as well as to men.  
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to 
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision – with the guidance of her 
physician and within the limits specified in Roe – whether to end her pregnancy.  A 
woman’s right to make that choice freely is fundamental.  Any other result, in our view, 
would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees 
equally to all.” (citations omitted)).   
126 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
127 The joint opinion states the importance of preserving the abortion right in terms of the 
interests of women who had organized their sexual and economic lives in reliance on the 
availability of abortion.  Id. at 856 (O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ., Joint Opinion) (“[F]or 
two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate 
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in 
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.  
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has 
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”).  
128 Id. at 852. 
129 Id.  
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The Court’s insistence that abortion regulation cannot enforce traditional sex 
roles also guides application of undue burden analysis in Casey.  Casey holds 
that the spousal notice requirement is an undue burden on women’s 
constitutionally protected right to decide whether to become a mother because 
the law reflected “a view of marriage consonant with the common-law status 
of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and 
of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution.”130  The joint opinion 
expresses “constitutional limitations on abortion laws in the language of its 
equal protection sex discrimination opinions, illuminating liberty concerns at 
the heart of the sex equality cases in the very act of recognizing equality 
concerns at the root of the liberty cases.”131 
Justice Ginsburg quotes Casey’s sex equality reasoning in her Gonzales v. 
Carhart dissent.132  But she goes even further.  Where Casey draws upon the 
conceptual framework of the sex equality argument for abortion rights – that 
government cannot use the power of the state to enforce traditional sex roles on 
women – Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent adds a discussion of key equal 
protection sex discrimination precedents, including decisions she litigated and 
wrote.133  In her Carhart dissent, Ginsburg fuses the normative power of 
equality arguments with the textual authority of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
130 Id. at 898.  
131 Siegel, supra note 5, at 831. 
132 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see also, e.g., id. at 170 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In 
reaffirming Roe, the Casey Court described the centrality of ‘the decision whether to bear . . . 
a child,’ to a woman’s ‘dignity and autonomy,’ her ‘personhood’ and ‘destiny,’ her 
‘conception of . . . her place in society.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 171 (“As Casey 
comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s ‘control over 
her [own] destiny.’ . . .  Women, it is now acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, and right 
‘to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.’  Their ability to realize 
their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately connected to ‘their ability to control 
their reproductive lives.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 171 n.2 (“Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey described more precisely than did Roe v. Wade the impact of 
abortion restrictions on women’s liberty.” (citations omitted)); id. at 172 (“[L]egal 
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some 
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her 
life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”); id. at 185 (citing Casey as 
evidence of the Court’s repeated confirmation “that ‘[t]he destiny of the woman must be 
shaped . . . on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society’”) 
(alteration in original).  
133 In objecting to the forms of woman-protective antiabortion argument to which the 
Carhart majority refers, see infra note 135, Justice Ginsburg invokes both negative and 
positive equal protection precedents, that is, the cases invalidated by modern understandings 
of sex discrimination, as well as the equal protection decisions that reflect this new 
understanding of women’s roles as citizens.  For example, Carhart said: 
This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and 
under the Constitution – ideas that have long since been discredited.  Compare, e.g., 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-423 (1908) (“protective” legislation imposing 
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It is this shift in the justification of the abortion right that prompted James 
Bopp, general counsel for the National Right to Life Committee, to warn the 
antiabortion movement to exercise care in the kinds of abortion challenges it 
sends the Court – the concern raised in the strategy memo that I quoted at the 
beginning of this Article.134  Beliefs about women’s citizenship are sufficiently 
different from those in the 1860s – when Connecticut adopted its abortion 
statute – or the 1970s when the Court first conferred constitutional protections 
on women’s abortion decisions – that even opponents of abortion rights have 
now begun to argue that restrictions on abortion are necessary to promote 
women’s health and freedom.  The perceived need to integrate expression of 
respect for women into antiabortion argument has fueled the spread of the 
abortion-hurts-women argument that Justice Kennedy drew upon in his opinion 
striking down the partial birth abortion ban act,135 claims that provoked Justice 
Ginsburg to counter by appeal to the equal protection sex discrimination 
cases.136  Bopp is worried that were Justice Kennedy faced with a ban wholly 
depriving women of control over the decision whether to become a mother – as 
the partial birth abortion ban act did not – that Kennedy might well side with 
Justice Ginsburg, sufficiently to give her an opportunity to express the more far 
 
hours-of-work limitations on women only held permissible in view of women’s 
“physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functio[n]”); Bradwell v. 
State, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“Man is, or should be, 
woman’s protector and defender.  The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which 
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . . 
.  The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother.”), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542, n. 
12 (1996) (State may not rely on “overbroad generalizations” about the “talents, 
capacities, or preferences” of women; “[s]uch judgments have . . . impeded . . . 
women’s progress toward full citizenship stature throughout our Nation’s history”); 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977) (gender-based Social Security 
classification rejected because it rested on “archaic and overbroad generalizations” 
“such as assumptions as to [women’s] dependency” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185 (alterations in original). 
134 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
135 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (2007) (“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression 
in the bond of love the mother has for her child.  The Act recognizes this reality as well.  
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision.  While we find 
no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some 
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.  
Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.” (citations omitted)).  For an account of 
the rise and spread of woman-protective antiabortion argument, see generally Siegel, Right’s 
Reasons, supra note 4. 
136 Justice Ginsburg cites to these cases to discredit the abortion-harms-woman argument 
as emblematic of a “way of thinking [that] reflects ancient notions about women’s place in 
the family and under the Constitution – ideas that have long since been discredited.”  
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185.  
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reaching complex of constitutional values at the root of the right Roe 
recognized.  
What difference would it make if the Court added an equality rationale to 
the privacy justification for abortion rights?  Perhaps most obviously at stake is 
a question of constitutional authority.  It is relatively safe to challenge 
constitutional privacy rights as “unenumerated,” but, calling for the deprivation 
of rights that vindicate women’s equal citizenship is an altogether riskier 
business – not simply because equality rights have a clear textual basis in the 
Constitution, but also because equality rights have trumping political authority.  
At issue, however, is more than the question whether the Court ties the 
abortion right to the Equal Protection Clause as Schlafly long predicted and 
Bopp has come to fear.  Beyond the question of which constitutional clauses 
protect the abortion right is its social meaning – the nation’s understanding of 
why the Constitution prohibits government from controlling women’s decision 
whether to become a mother.  Here we move beyond the constitutional and 
political authority of the sex equality claim for abortion rights to its critical 
basis.  At its core, the sex equality argument understands criminal abortion 
laws as reflecting and reinforcing traditional gender roles in matters of sex and 
parenting.  It understands criminal abortion statutes as reflecting views about 
women as well as the unborn – whether the law is enacted for fetal-protective 
or woman-protective purposes.137  And it understands the harms criminal 
abortion statutes inflict on women as flowing, in significant part, from norms 
and arrangements premised on gender-differentiated roles in sex and parenting 
that this society uneasily and increasingly senses to be unjust.  The sex equality 
argument for abortion rights thus questions (1) whether the impetus for 
criminal abortion statutes is wholly benign and (2) whether the impact of 
criminal abortion statutes on women is wholly inevitable. 
The sex equality argument for abortion rights is practical and utopian at one 
and the same time.  As a practical matter, it conceives of the abortion right as 
enabling women better to negotiate unjust social arrangements.  As a 
normative matter, the sex equality argument for the abortion right imagines an 
alternative universe in which women would be able to make their own choices 
in sex and parenting, free of norms and arrangements that push sexually active 
women to bear children, and that push women into dependency on men or the 
state in order to raise children that men and women together conceive.  On this 
normative understanding, abortion rights alone are insufficient to secure 
freedom or equality.  This was the vision the women’s movement expressed 
when it memorialized the Nineteenth Amendment with demands for abortion 
 
137 For an account of how fetal protective abortion restrictions reflect judgments about 
women as well as the unborn, see Siegel, supra note 107, at 323-80.  For an account of the 
kinds of gender-conventional views about women embodied in woman-protective abortion 
restrictions, see Siegel, Dignity, supra note 4, at 1767-95; Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics 
of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 991, 999-1028; Siegel, Right’s Reasons, supra note 4, at 1651-81.   
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rights and childcare – both negative and positive rights.138  The sex equality 
argument for abortion rights grows out of a vision, and a structural 
understanding, of what genuine freedom of choice looks like, which locates 
responsibility for the conditions in which women conceive and rear children in 
the society that would criminalize abortion, and imagines equal citizenship for 




138 See supra text accompanying note 28.  Movement lawyers initially read Roe as 
recognizing a right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than a right to privacy 
under the Ninth Amendment and thought that might “imply that the state has some kind of 
affirmative obligation to ensure that a woman can exercise that right to liberty [which] 
presumably will have very important implications for access questions like Medicaid, for 
example.”  See Goodman, Schoenbrod & Stearns, supra note 42, at 27. 
